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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the District Court correct in ruling as a matter of law 
that rental equipment is outside the coverage of the payment 
bond provided by Kiewit through Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Company in compliance with Sections 14-1-14 and 63-56-38/ 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended/ or should rental 
equipment be considered a part of "labor or material" 
furnished to the contractor or subcontractor within the 
contemplation of the bond and the public bonding statutes. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Section 63-56-38, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (1980 version, 
amended 1985 and 1987). 
2. Section 14-1-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (1983 version, 
repealed 1987) . 
3. Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
4. Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
5. 40 U.S. C. Section 270a, et seq., Miller Act (See Appendix 
for text of statutes). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition 
in the court below. 
Plaintiff filed this action on January 23, 1986 seeking 
recovery from plaintiffs for lease payments on a D-8K Caterpillar 
bulldozer rented to Gallegos Construction Company for production 
of gravel products for a State of Utah highway construction 
project. (R. 4, 9, and 16) 
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 t\ . . - ^ii _:I.*L*, thereupon moved m e court 
for certification of the prior judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)/ 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ on the basis that no just reason 
existed for delay in entry of final judgment as to Smith's Third 
Cause of Action (the bond claim against Kiewit and Aetna). (R. 86-87) 
On September 24, 1987/ the court entered its Second Amended 
Judgment finding that the action involved multiple claims and 
parties/ that the claim against the Aetna bond had been finally 
decided/ and that no just reason existed for delay in entry of 
final judgment as to the bond claim. (R. 83-86) This appeal 
followed. 
B. Statement of facts. 
On or about January 7, 1985/ defendant Aetna issued a 
payment bond in compliance with Utah's public bonding statutes 
in the amount of $11/491/141.40/ listing Kiewit Western Company 
as principal/ Aetna as surety/ and the State of Utah as obligee. 
(R. 4, R. 9, and R. 16) 
The bond purported to cover a contract between Kiewit 
and the State of Utah for "grading/ drainage/ surfacing and 
signing" work in Salt Lake County/ State of Utah/ Project No. 
F-018(25). (R. 9) 
Pursuant to written contracts/ as amended/ between 
defendants Kiewit and Gallegos Construction Company (Gallegos) 
(R. 17)/ Gallegos supplied gravel products for the subject 
project/ which was known as the 2100 South Highway Project. (R. 16) 
Plaintiff D. L. Smith & Sons, Inc. (Smith)/ pursuant to 
a written lease agreement, rented a D-8K Caterpillar bulldozer 
to Gallegos for use in producing gravel products called for 
under the Kiewit-Gallegos contract, which products were 
incorporated into the 2100 South Highway Project. (R. 2-4, 6-8) 
Smith claimed that the equipment was used by Gallegos 
between approximately March 20, 1985 and September 1, 1985 and 
that Gallegos owed Smith the sum of $42,720.00 for rental 
expenses, after deducting credits and offsets, in addition to 
$34,117.00 in repair costs incurred during the course of the 
project. (R. 2-3) 
Pursuant to the statutory notice requirements, Smith 
asserted he gave written notice of his intent to sue on the 
Kiewit bond to both Kiewit and Aetna on or about October 25, 1985. 
(R. 4) 
Prior to trial of the matter, the court granted the Motion 
for Summary Judgment of Kiewit and Aetna on the basis that rental 
equipment was not compensible labor and materials within the 
scope of Section 63-56-38(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. (R. 83-85) The court did not reach other issues and 
made its ruling as a matter of law. (R. 83) Pursuant to Rule 
54(b), the court certified its ruling on Smith's Third Cause of 
Action, and this appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
In J.F. Tolton Inv. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 293 P. 611, 
11 Utah 226 (1930), the Utah Supreme Court held that the language 
"labor or materials" included in a payment bond for a state 
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highway construction project should be liberally construed and 
that the surety should pay, along with other costs and expenses 
on the project, the balance owing for rental of an engine used 
on the project. Utah's public bonding statutes contain language 
similar to the language in the bond construed in Tolton and 
similar public policy considerations are involved. The court 
should construe Utah's public bonding statutes consistently with 
Tolton and should hold that rental equipment expenses are covered 
by the bond. 
POINT II 
Utah's public bonding statutes are very similar to the 
Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. Sec. 270b, which has been consistently 
construed to cover equipment rental costs. The Tolton case 
demonstrates that this court has adopted the same liberal 
construction of public bond language followed by the federal 
courts in construing the Miller Act. 
POINT III 
Utah's private bonding statute and mechanic's lien statute 
expressly provide for payment of rental equipment expenses. 
In amending the mechanic's lien statute in 1981 and the private 
bonding statute in 1985, the legislature is assumed to be aware 
of the interpretation given public bond language by the Tolton 
case and to have acted to bring the mechanic's lien and private 
bond statutes in line with the liberal construction used with 
public bonds. The statutes are in pari materia and should be 
construed together in a consistent fashion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS COURT HAS HELD THAT RENTAL EQUIPMENT 
IS INCLUDED WITHIN THE MEANING OF "LABOR 
OR MATERIALS". 
In J.F. Tolton Inv. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co./ 293 
P. 611/ 77 Utah 226 (1930), this court held, in interpreting the 
language of a payment bond for a state highway construction 
project/ that the terms "labor or materials" included the balance 
owing for rental of an engine used on the construction project. 
Id. at 615. 
The Tolton case provided several significant guidelines 
for interpretation of contractor's bonds for public construction 
projects in Utah. With regard to interpretation of surety bonds, 
the court stated as follows: 
Our own court is committed to the rule that the 
contract of a surety is to be strictly construed 
against the surety. Id. at 612. 
See also Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile/ GMC/ Inc. v. Zdunich/ 668 P.2d 
557, 560 (Utah 1983). 
The language of the bond/ as set forth by the court/ was 
as follows: 
[The] subcontractor 'shall well and truly pay all and 
every person furnishing material or performing labor 
in and about the construction of said roadway all and 
every sum or sums of money due him, them or any of them 
for all such labor and materials for which the 
subcontractor is liable.' JEd. at 611-612. 
Plaintiffs obtained judgment in the District Court against 
the surety, the trial court finding the surety responsible for 
payment of food and supplies/ wages/ labor and repairs on autos 
and trucks/ gasoline and oil/ haulage charges for coal and other 
supplies/ and rental for use of an engine on the job. £d. at 612. 
In considering the surety's appeal, the. court made the following 
comments about the bond language: 
The language of the bond clearly imports more than 
payment for the materials and labor which go directly 
into the completed work. Its essential representation 
is that all persons furnishing labor or materials to 
the subcontractor in connection with the performance 
of its contract shall be paid. And this contemplates 
a performance of the contract according to customary 
practices. Modern construction work is accomplished 
largely by the use of machinery and mechanical power. 
In the larger undertakings elaborate organization is 
required involving much preliminary preparation and 
expenditure. It is often necessary to construct lines 
of communication and travel and to establish camps. 
The assembling of equipment and its maintenance is a 
common necessity. When engines and motors are employed/ 
fuel and lubrication are indispensable. These and other 
incidentals go but indirectly into the finished job/ 
but they are all necessary/ and are commonly understood 
to be involved in the usual method of doing such work. 
And/ when men contract concerning the labor and materials 
furnished 'in and about1 the construction of particular 
work/ it is vain to say that they did not mean to include 
all of the preliminary and incidental work necessary to 
the finished job. 
What we think is the correct rule/ supported by the great 
weight of authority/ is that such contracts are to be 
construed with great liberality in favor of the persons 
dealing with contractors/ and that sureties should be 
held for labor and materials furnished the contractor 
which proximately relate to the performance of the 
contract and contribute to/ and are reasonably appropriate 
and necessary to/ its completion/ even though such labor 
or materials are not applied directly to the finished job. 
This does not include liability for money loaned the 
contractor nor materials furnished which from their 
nature and use will not be consumed in the work. But 
it does include a wide range of incidentals which form 
no component part of the finished structure/ but are 
commonly understood to be appropriate and necessary 
when such construction work is carried on according to 
customary and approved practices. Id. at 612. 
The court then examined each of the above-mentioned items 
for which claims had been made aginst the bond. In referring 
to the claim for engine rental/ the court stated as follows: 
The last item in dispute is the plaintiff's claim 
amounting to $74.25/ the balance due for rental for 
an engine used on the job. As in the case of most 
of the other items in dispute/ there is a conflict 
in the decisions as to whether a charge of this kind 
is within the contractor's bond. There are many cases 
upon the subject which are collected in an annotation 
found in 44 A.L.R. 381. Without further reference to 
the cases/ it may be said that, under the liberal rule 
of interpretation to which we are committed/ we conclude 
that the charge in question is within the obligation 
of the bond/ and the surety was properly held liable 
therefor. Ijd. at 615. 
With regard to the present fact situation/ the bond 
provided by Aetna pursuant to Section 14-1-5/ Utah Code Annotated 
1953/ as amended/ provides as follows: 
Now/ therefore/ the condition of this obligation is 
such/ that if the said Principal shall pay all claimants 
supplying labor or materials to him or his subcontractors 
in the prosecution of the work provided for in said 
contract/ then/ this obligation shall be void/ otherwise 
to remain in full force and effect. 
Provided/ however/ that this bond is executed pursuant 
to the provisions of Title 14/ Chapter 1/ Utah Code 
Annotated/ 1953/ as amended/ and all liabilities on 
this bond to all such claimants shall be determined 
in accordance with, said provisions/ to the same extent 
as if it were copied at length herein. (R. 9) (Appendix p.20) 
Sections 14-1-5 through 14-1-12 of the Utah Code were repealed 
in 1980 and were thus not in effect at the time the bond was 
executed in this matter on January 7, 1985. Section 14-1-14/ 
however/ was then in effect and provided as follows: 
(1) Any person who has furnished labor or material 
to the contractor or subcontractor for the work 
provided in the contract for which a payment bond 
is furnished under this chapter/ and has not been 
paid in full within ninety days from the date on 
which the last of the labor was performed or material 
was supplied/ shall have the right to sue on the 
payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the 
suit is filed and to sue on the contract for the 
amount due. 
- Q _ 
(2) Any person having a contract with a subcontractor 
of the contractor/ but no express or implied contract 
with the contractor furnishing the payment bond/ 
shall have a right of action upon the payment bond 
upon giving written notice to the contractor within 
ninety days from the date on which the last of the 
labor was performed or material wa: supplied. . . • 
(Repealed 1987) (Appendix p. 23) 
The Utah Procurement Code provisions set forth in Section 
63-56-38(3)/ which Kiewit and Aetna claim to be controlling/ 
provided in January, 1985, when the bond was executed/ as follows: 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material 
to the contractor or subcontractor for the work 
provided in the contract/ in respect of which a 
payment bond is furnished under this section/ who has 
not been paid in full within ninety days from the date 
on which the last of the labor was performed or material 
was supplied by the person for whom the claim is made/ 
shall have the right to sue on the payment bond for 
any amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted 
and to prosecute the action for the amount due the 
person. However/ any person having a contract with 
a subcontractor of the contractor/ but no express or 
implied contract with the contractor furnishing the 
payment bond, shall have a right of action upon the 
payment bond upon giving written notice to the 
contractor within ninety days from the date on which 
the last of the labor was performed or material was 
suppled by the person for whom the claim was made. . . . 
(Appendix p.24) 
It should be noted that/ with minor wording differences/ 
the provisions of Section 14-1-14 and 63-56-38 are almost identical. 
Although the court in Tolton was construing a bond rather 
than a statute/ similar language and policy considerations are 
involved. There is no indication in the language of Utah's 
public bonding statutes or in any Utah case law since Tolton 
that the words "labor or material" are to be construed to exclude 
rental equipment costs. 
An evaluation of Virginia law by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit involved similar considerations. 
In R.C. Stanhope/ Inc. v. Roanoke Construction Co./ 539 F.2d 992 
(4th Cir. 1976)/ the court applied Virginia law in upholding a 
District Court decision allowing plaintiff/ who rented pilings 
to a subcontractor/ to recover under a payment bond. The court 
considered two prior decisions of the Virginia Supreme Court/ 
one of which had interpreted the language of a payment bond. 
The court evaluated the case as follows: 
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Moretrench Corp., 184 Va. 
318, 35S.E.2d 74 (1945) the Supreme Court was required 
to construe contractual language in a payment bond 
virtually identical to that which appears in Section 
11-23 [Virginia's public bonding statute]. The facts 
in the Moretrench case were likewise quite similar to 
those presently before us. In Moretrench/ the court 
held that rental charges for equipment leased to the 
general contractor did constitute 'materials furnished' 
within the terms of the bond. The court further held 
that the value of missing leased equipment was within 
the coverage of the bond as constituting 'materials 
furnished' in completing the contract. While 
Moretrench involved a bonding contract and the present 
appeal involves a statute, the bonding requirements 
are expressed in virtually identical terms. We are 
unconvinced that the Virginia Supreme Court would 
construe the same language differently solely because 
it appears in a statute rather than a contract/ 
especially where the very purpose of the statute is 
to cover the failure to require a payment bond. Id. at 994. 
Likewise/ the same considerations used in construing the 
payment bond in Tolton should be used in construing Utah's 
public bonding statutes. 
POINT II. UTAH'S PUBLIC BONDING STATUTES ARE 
PATTERNED AFTER THE MILLER ACT, WHICH 
IS INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE RENTAL 
EQUIPMENT. 
Utah's public bonding statutes are very similar to the 
federal public bond statute found at 40 U.S.C. Section 270b, 
commonly known as the Miller Act: 
(a) Every person who has furnished labor or material 
in the prosecution of the work provided for in such 
contract/ in respect of which a payment bond is 
furnished under Section 270a of this title and who 
has not been paid in full therefor before the expiration 
of a period of ninety days after the day on which the 
last of the labor was done or performed by him or 
material was furnished or supplied by him for which 
such claim is made/ shall have the right to sue on 
such payment bond for the amount, or the balance 
thereof/ unpaid at the time of institution of such 
suit and to prosecute said action to final execution 
and judgment for the sum or sums justly due him; 
Provided/ however/ That any person having direct 
contractual relationship with the subcontractor but 
no contractual relationship express or implied with 
the contractor furnishing said payment bond shall have 
a right of action upon the said payment bond upon 
giving written notice to said contractor within ninety 
days from the date on which such person did or performed 
the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the last 
of the materials for which such claim is made/ . . . 
(Appendix p. 29 ) 
The Miller Act/ which became effective in 1935/ and its predecessor 
the Heard Act/ are liberally construed. As stated by the court 
in Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States of America/ 322 U.S. 
102, 88 L.ed. 1163, 1167 (1943), 
The Miller Act, like the Heard Act, is highly remedial 
in nature. It is entitled to a liberal construction 
and application in order properly to effectuate the 
Congressional intent to protect those whose labor and 
materials go into public projects. . . . 
As acknowledged in a subsequent Fifth Circuit decision, the Miller 
Act has been "uniformly construed to include equipment rentals." 
J.W. Carruth v. Standard Accident Insurance, 329 F.2d 690, 693 
(5th Cir. 1964). 
While this court is not bound by the interpretation by 
federal courts of a federal statute/ the same purpose is served 
by both the state and federal bonding statutes and the same 
considerations would appear to be involved. As noted previously, 
under Utah law a bond is "strictly construed against the surety," 
Tolton, supra at 612, and bond contracts are to be "construed 
with great liberality in favor of the persons dealing with 
contractors." Id. Utah does not prohibit by statute recovery 
of rental expenses against a surety on a public project nor has 
any decision of this court held that recovery of rental expenses 
is improper. On the contrary, the Tolton decision indicates 
clearly that this court has adopted the same liberal construction 
of public bond language as is followed by the federal courts in 
construing the Miller Act. The language of Sections 14-1-14 and 
63-56-38 should likewise be construed to allow recovery of 
expenses for rental equipment. 
POINT III. UTAH'S PUBLIC BONDING STATUTES SHOULD 
BE READ CONSISTENTLY WITH THE MECHANIC'S 
LIEN AND PRIVATE BOND STATUTES, WHICH 
EXPRESSLY PROVIDE FOR RENTAL EQUIPMENT. 
In 1981, the Utah Legislature amended Section 38-1-3, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, the mechanic's lien statute, to include 
provisions relating to rental of material or equipment. In 1985, 
a similar amendment to the private bond statute, Section 14-2-1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, was made. (See appendix for full text 
of both statutes pp. 25 and 26) 
Although Utah's public bonding statutes have not been 
amended to include specific language about rental equipment, it 
is a well accepted principle of statutory construction that when 
the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous 
statutes and case law. In Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 
(Utah 1983), this court cited with approval the following language 
from Sutherland Statutory Construction: 
In terms of legislative intent/ it is assumed that 
whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has 
in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject 
matter/ wherefore it is held that in the absence of 
any express repeal or amendment therein/ the new 
provision was enacted in accord with the legislative 
policy embodied in those prior statutes/ and they all 
should be construed together. 2A C. Sands/ Sutherland 
Statutory Construction/ Section 51.02/ at 290 (4th ed. 
1973), cited supra at 1318. 
In addition, it is assumed that the legislature is familiar 
with prior decisions of this court construing terminology 
included in the statute. For example/ in Rish v. Theo Bros. 
Construction Company/ Inc./ 237 S.E.2d 61 (S.C. 1977), the South 
Carolina Supreme Court/ in attempting to interpret the term 
"labor and materials"/ held that the language did not include 
rental equipment because a prior decision of the South Carolina 
Supreme Court had so held. The prior decision had been handed 
down before enactment of the public bonding statute in question. 
The appellant in Rish argued that the South Carolina 
Supreme Court had never construed the public bonding statute 
and that the prior decision interpreting language in a bond to 
exclude rental equipment should not be controlling. He urged 
the court to adopt a liberal interpretation of the statute 
similar to the interpretation given the Miller Act. Although 
the court in Rish acknowledged that "adoption of the wording 
of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction/ carries 
with it the previous judicial interpretation of the wording . . ."/ 
Id. at 63/ the legislature was assumed to have been aware of 
the court's prior interpretation of the key language embodied 
by the legislature in its statute: 
When it appears that the legislature did not intend to 
adopt the judicial decisions of another jurisdiction/ 
this Court will not engraft those decisions upon the 
statute of our legislature. Here/ in enacting Section 
33-224 [the South Carolina Public Bonding Statute], 
the legislature was using the very words that were the 
key language in South Carolina Supply & Equipment 
Company and Kline (albeit/ of course, that those same 
words appeared in the Miller Act). It must be presumed 
that the legislature was familiar with our holding in 
South Carolina Equipment & Supply Company and that it 
intended for 'labor and materials' to be construed as it 
had been in that decision. Ld. at 63. 
The opposite situation is present in this case. This court 
in Tolton construed "labor or materials11 to include rental 
equipment and the legislature is presumed to have been aware of 
this construction at the time it later enacted the public bonding 
statutes. 
In amending the mechanic's lien statute and private 
bonding statute in 1981 and 1985, the Utah legislature was 
apparently concerned that those statutes be brought into compliance 
with the liberal construction afforded the public bond language. 
It may be that the legislature acted with an overabundance of 
caution, since the doctrine of in pari materia would indicate 
that the public and private bonding statutes should be read in 
harmony with each other. 
A clear definition of in pari materia is given by the 
Arizona Supreme Court in Collins v. Stockwell, 671 P.2d 394 
(Ariz. 1983), as follows: 
In pari materia is a rule of statutory construction 
whereby the meaning and application of a specific 
statute or portion of a statute is determined by 
looking to statutes which relate to the same person 
or thing and which have a purpose similar to that 
of the statute being construed. Statutes in pari 
materia must be read together and all parts of the 
law on the same subject must be given effect/ if 
possible. Ld. at 397, citing Arizona Gunite Builders, 
Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company, 105 Ariz. 99, 
459 P.2d 724 (1969). 
The Arizona Gunite case cited in Collins is instructive 
because the Arizona Supreme Court was there dealing with 
interpretation of a public bonding statute with language similar 
to the Utah statute. The court noted that the Arizona mechanic's 
lien law expressly provided for liens relating to equipment 
rental and held that the public bonding statute would be liberally 
interpreted to also include rental equipment. J^ d. at 727. The 
court concluded by stating as follows: 
While the decisions in other States are not uniform 
on this subject we are of the opinion that our 
statutes require that we adopt the better rule as 
expressed in Moran Towing Corp. v. M.A. Gammino 
Construction Co., 363 F.2d 108, 114 (1st Cir.) in 
[sic] passing upon the Miller Act, which is very 
similar to Section 32-1152 [the Arizona Public 
Bonding "Statute], the Court said: 
'The language of the Miller Act is rather strict. 
Nevertheless it has long been liberally construed. 
Specifically, in the case of rented equipment, 
not only does the surety • s obligation include 
the rental, but if the principal has undertaken 
to repair, or to assume the expense of ordinary 
wear and tear, its failure to perform in this 
respect may be a matter covered by the bond. 
Continental Casualty Co. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co., 
10th Cir., 1944, 140 F.2d 115; United States for 
Use and Benefit of Wyatt & Kipper Engineers, Inc. 
v. Ramstad Constr. Co., D. Alaska 1961, 194 F.Supp 
379. . . . " id. at 727. 
The Utah Supreme Court has used the doctrine of in pari 
materia in construing the statutory language of the private 
bond statute and the mechanic's lien statute. In King Bros., 
Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 
(1962), the court was attempting to determine the extent of 
materials lienable under the private contractor's bonding 
statute. The court noted as follows: 
Because of the common purpose of these lien and 
contractor's bond statutes [referring to Sections 
14-2-2 and 38-1-3, U.C.A. 1953], and their practically 
identical language, adjudications as to what is lienable 
under the former are helpful in determining the proper 
application of the latter. Ld. at 341. 
Clearly both the Utah Legislature and this court have 
taken a liberal view of what is included under the term "labor 
or materials" as found in the public bonding statutes. If the 
private and public statutes are to be read consistently with 
each other, rental equipment cannot be excluded from the pubic 
bonding statutes without doing violence to the language of the 
statutes, the approach set forth in the Tolton case, and 
principles of liberal statutory construction used in construing 
all statutes designed to protect those providing labor or 
materials on public construction projects. 
CONCLUSION 
This court held almost 60 years ago that the words "labor 
or materials" should be, 
construed with great liberality in favor of the 
persons dealing with contractors, and that sureties 
should be held for labor and materials furnished 
the contractor which proximately relate to the 
performance of the contract and contribute to, and 
are reasonably appropriate and necessary to, its 
completion, even though such labor and materials 
are not applied directly to the finish job. 
Tolton, supra, at 612. 
Rental equipment is as essential to completion of any major 
public contract as hired labor would be if such equipment was 
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not available. it is one of the "common necessities" of modern 
construction wotk. This court in Tolton followed the better 
rule which allows those providing rental equipment to recover 
under the payment bonds required by Utah law. The Utah 
Legislature, as evidenced by its amendment of the private 
bonding statute and the mechanic's lien statute to include 
rental equipment, which brings those statutes in line with the 
liberal interpretation of public bonding language given in 
Tolton, must be assumed to be aware of and in accord with the 
holdings of thi§ court. 
The trial court's erroneous ruling that rental equipment 
is not covered by Utahfs public bonding statutes should be 
reversed and this case should be remanded for trial on the merits 
of Smith's claims. 
DATED this ^C2^ day of January, 1988. 
DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
D.L. Smith & Sons, Inc. 
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TITLE 14 
CONTRACTORS' BONDS 
Chapter 
1. Public Contracts. 
2. Private Contracts. 
CHAPTER 1 
PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
Section 
14-1-1. Repealed. 
14-M.l. Repealed 
14-1-2 to 14-1-4 Repealed 
14-1-5 to 14-112 Repealed. 
14-1-13. Performance and payment bonds on 
public projects — Conditions 
and terms. 
14-1*14. Actions on payment bonds. 
14-1-15. Liability of state or political subdivi-
sion failing to obtain bond 
14-1-16. Attorney's fees 
14-117. Exemption of entities subject to Pro-
curement Code. 
14-1-1. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 14-1-1 (L. 1909. ch. 68. 
I 1, 1917, ch 36. § 2; C.L 1917. * 3753; R.S 
1933 & C. 1943. $ 17-1-1), providing for bond 
to protect mechanics and materialmen, was re-
pealed by U w i 1963, ch 15. t 6. 
14-1-1.1. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 14-1-1.1 (L. 1953, dt. 23, 
| 1 ) , relating to security in connection with 
bids, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 75, I 5. 
For present comparable provisions, see 
f 63-56-1 et saq. 
14-1-2 to 14-1-4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 14-1-2 to 14-1-4 (L. 
1909, ch. 68, ff 1, 2; 1917, ch 36. I 2; C.L. 
1917. ** 3753 to 3755; R.S. 1933 * C. 1943, 
17-1-2 to 17-1-4; L. 1961, ch. 27, i 1), relating 
to recovery on bonds to protect mechanics and 
materialmen, were repealed by Laws 1963. ch. 
15. * 6 
14-1-5 to 14-1-12. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 14-1-5 to 14-1-12 (L 
1963 ch. 15, 5$ 1 to 5; 1969, ch 36, §5 1 to 3 
relating to bonding of contractors for public 
buildings and public works, were repealed by 
Laws 1980 ch 75, § 5 For present comparable 
provision* see 5 63-56-1 et seq 
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14-1-13 CONTRACTORS* BONDS 
14-1-13. Performance and payment bonds on public 
projects — Conditions and terms. 
(1) Before any contract for the construction, alteration or repair of any 
public building, public work or public improvement of the state or its political 
subdivisions is awarded to any person, that person shall furnish to the appro-
priate political entity the following bonds: 
(a) a performance bond in and amount equal to 100% of the price speci-
fied in the contract upon the faithful performance of the contract, solely 
for the protection of the political entity awarding the contract; and 
(b) a payment bond in an amount equal to 100% of the price specified in 
the contract, solely for the protection of persons supplying labor or mate-
rials to the contractor or his subcontractors for the performance of work 
provided for in the contract. 
(2) Each bond shall be: 
(a) binding upon the award of the contract to the person; 
(b) executed by a surety company or companies duly authorized to do 
business in this state; 
(c) payable to the appropriate political entity; and 
(d) filed in the office of the political entity awarding the contract. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the 
state or its political subdivisions to require additional performance bonds or 
other security. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 1. 
14-1-14. Actions on payment bonds. 
(1) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or 
subcontractor for the work provided in the contract for which a payment bond 
is furnished under this chapter, and has not been paid in full within 90 days 
from the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material was 
supplied, shall have the right to sue on the payment bond for any amount 
unpaid at the time the suit is filed and to sue on the contract for the amount 
due. 
(2) Any person having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but 
no express or implied contract with the contractor furnishing the payment 
bond, shall have a right of action upon the payment bond upon giving written 
notice to the contractor within 90 days from the date on which the last of the 
labor was performed or material was supplied. The person shall state in the 
notice the amount claimed and the name of the party for whom the labor was 
performed or to whom the material was supplied. The notice shall be served 
personally or by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope 
addressed to the contractor at any place the contractor maintains an office or 
conducts business. 
(3) Any person may obtain from the appropriate political entity a certified 
copy of a bond upon payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and 
postage. A certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the con-
tents, execution, and delivery of the original. 
(4) Any action instituted on the payment bond shall be brought in the 
appropriate court in the political subdivision in which the contract was to be 
performed. The action shall be commenced within one one year after the 
furnishing of materials or labor, except if the claimant is a subcontractor of 
the contractor, the action shall be commenced within one year from the date 
on which final payment under the subcontract became due. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, S 2. 
UTAH PE0CU1EMENT CODE ww-oo 
(1935 amendment a l s o showing language p r i o r t o 1985) 
C3-56-3S. Bonds aecessary when contract it awarded. (1) When a construc-
tion contract is awarded, the following bonds or security shall be delivered to the 
state and shall become binding on the parties upon the execution of the contract 
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to 100> 
of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company authorized to 
do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to the state; and 
(b) a payment bond satisfactory* to the state, in an amount equal to 100^ of 
the price specified m the contract, executed by a surety company authorized to do 
business in this stale or any other form satisfactory to the state, for the protection 
of all persons supplying labor and materia! to the contractor or its subcontractors 
for the performance of the work provided for in the contract. 
(2) Rules [and legulatioaa] may provide for waiver of the requirement of a per-
formance or payment bond where a bond is deemed unnecessary for the protection 
of the state. 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or subcon-
tractor for the work provided in the contract in respect of which a paymen; bond 
is furnished under this section, who has not been paid in full within 90 days from 
the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material was supplied 
by the person for whom the claim is made, [abwH ko*e %he rig)* to] may sue on 
the payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and 
[%e] may prosecute the action for the amount due the person [However,] Any person 
having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but no express or implied 
contract with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, [ahaH fc**e] has a right 
of action upon the payment bond upon giving written notice to the contractor and 
surety company within 90 days from the date on which the last of the labor was 
performed or material was supplied by the person for whom the claim is made 
The person shall state in the notice the amount claimed and the name of the party 
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for whom the labor was performed or to whom the material was supplied Th* 
notice shall be served [personally oe] by registered or certified mail, postage pre 
paid, [HI •« envelope addressed to] on the contractor and surety company at ar. 
place the contractor or surety company maintains an office or conducts business 
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond shall be brought in the distrir 
court of the count) in which the construction contract was to be performed,' $&* 
tn> t^frtr SBOTT oe ewwfweftee'O rtrtee troft owe year rfwit Hie oate ofi wnicn ijw ?•** 
o» Tm1 ta^ Or w^ a? pe^ wwfl^ ec or fliareetar A^^ SB sttjrptteo oy me person wrHT^ frft^  ^^ 
atH4-j No sujt may be commenced bj; a claimant under this section more thar. ^ 
davs after a surety finally denies thaj claimant's claim The obligee named in :h* 
bond need not be joined as a party in the suit 
History: C. 1953. 63-56-38. enacted by L. 
1980, ch 75. |1;L 1985, ch 202, » 1 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRIVATE CONTRACTS 
Section Section 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanic* sad mate- 14-2-3 Action on kond to protect mechanics 
rialmen end materialmen — Attorney's 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond — Direct lit .
 A - M . *•* 
bality — Limitation ef actions 14"2"* ***VUmiB - Mortgagees, beneficiax-
J
 as*, tnvtees 
14*2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving S2.000 
or more, for the construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, 
structure, or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is com-
menced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum aqua] to the contract 
price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful perfor-
mance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished, equipment 
and materials rented, and labor performed under the contract. This bond runs 
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear. Any person 
who has furnished or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor 
for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which payment 
has not been made, has a direct right of action against the sureties upon such 
bond for the reasonable value of the rented materials or equipment fiimished, 
for the reasonable value of the materials furnished, or for labor performed not 
exceeding the prices agreed upon. "Hus right of action accrues 40 days after 
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the work pro-
vided for in the contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request 
History: L I t 15 ch. 91. ft 1 i s 3; C.L 
1917. | | 376* to 3761. R£. 1933 4 C. 1*43 
17-2-1; L. 1977. ek. 56. ! 3; 19*5. cb 219, | ]. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1965 amend 
•en! inserted "equipment snd materials 
isnted," slier " material furnished" near the 
end of the first sentence of tht fiiv. paragraph 
sf the section, divided the second sentence into 
the second, third and fourth sentences; substi-
tuted 'This bond runs" at the beginning of the 
second sentence for "Such bond shall run"; de-
leted "and" after "may appear" to form the 
third sentence inserted "or rented any equip-
ment or" before "materials" in the third sen-
tence; substituted "for which payment* in the 
third sentence for '"payment for which", substi-
tuted "has" for "shall have", inserted "for the 
reasonable value of the rented materials or 
equipment furnished' in the third sentence af-
ter "upon such bond*, substituted "for labor 
performed not exceeding the prices agreed 
upon" at the end of the third sentence for 
"labor performed not exceeding however, in 
any case the price* agreed upon, which' sub-
stituted This right of action accrue* 40 days" 
in the fourth sentence for "right of anion shall 
accrue for 40 dsy*" substituted "This bond" in 
the last paragraph for The bond herein pro-
Tided for , and mack minor change in phrase 
siogy and punctuation 
CHAPTER 1 
MECHANICS' LIENS 
Section Section 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may cording — Service on owner of 
be attached — Lien on ores property 
mined 38-1-12 Repealed 
38-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Re-
38-1-2. "Contractors" and "subcontractors" defined. 
Application. unrelated to the mechanics* lien law. 
The definition of subcontractor contained Jacohsen Constr. Co. v. Industrial Indemnity 
in this section is not applicable to situations Co. < 1983 > 657 P 2d 1325 
38-1*3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached — 
Lien on ores mined. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any services or 
furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any building or structure or improvement to 
any premises in any manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish 
materials for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any 
mining claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed archi-
tects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, 
maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superinten-
dence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed 
labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor or furnished or rented materials or 
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38-1-3 LIENS 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed or mate-
rials or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the 
instance of the owner or of any other person acting by .his authority as 
agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall attach only to such interest 
as the owner may have in the property, but the interest of a lessee of a 
mining claim, mine or deposit, whether working under bond or otherwise, 
shall for the purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated 
while the same remain upon the premises included within the lease. 
History: R.S 1896 * C.L. 1907, *§ 1372, Compiler's Notes. — The 19$: amend-
1381. 1382. 1397; L. 1911, ch. 27. $ 12; C.L. mem inserted references to renting and 
1917, ft* 286. 3722, 3731, 3732, 3747; ILS. equipment throughout the section 
1933 & C. 1943, 5213; L. 1973, ch. 73, $ 1; 
1981, ch. 170, § 1. 
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BUILDINGS AND WORKS GENERALLY 40 § 270a 
§ 2 7 0 a * Bonds of contractor* of public building* or works 
(o) Typ« of bonds roquirod 
Before any contract, exceeding $25,000 in amount, for the construction, 
alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the United 
States is awarded to any person, such person shall furnish to the United 
States the following bonds, which shall become binding upon the award of 
the contract to such person, who is hereinafter designated as "contractor": 
(1) A performance bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the 
officer awarding such contract, and in such amount as he shall deem 
adequate, for the protection of the United States. 
(2) A payment bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to such 
officer for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in 
the prosecution of the work provided for in said contract for the use of 
each such person. Whenever the total amount payable by the terms of 
the contract shall be not more than $1,000,000 the said payment bond 
shall be in a sum of one-half the total amount payable by the terms of 
the contract. Whenever the total amount payable by the terms of the 
contract shall be more than $1,000,000 and not more than $5,000,000, 
the said payment bond shall be in a sum of 40 per centum of the total 
amount payable by the terms of the contract Whenever the total 
amount payable by the terms of the contract shall be more than 
$5,000,000 the said payment bond shall be in the sum of $2,500,000. 
(b) Wotvor of bonds for contract* pftormod in foreign cowrtrt* 
The contracting officer in respect of any contract is authorized to waive 
the requirement of a performance bond and payment bond for so much of 
the work under such contract as is to be performed in a foreign country if 
he finds that it is impracticable for the contractor to furnish such bonds. 
(c) Authority to roquir* oddfflonol bonds 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of any 
contracting officer to require a performance bond or other security in 
addition to those, or in cases other than the cases specified in subsection (a) 
of this section. 
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(d) Coverage for taxes in performance bond 
Every performance bond required under this section shall specifically 
provide coverage for taxes imposed by the United States which are collect-
ed, deducted, or withheld from wages paid by the contractor in carrying 
out the contract with respect to which such bond is furnished. However, 
the United States shall give the surety or sureties on such bond written 
notice, with respect to any such unpaid taxes attributable to any period, 
within ninety days after the date when such contractor files a return for 
such period, except that no such notice shall be given more than one 
hundred and eighty days from the date when a return for the period was 
required to be filed under Title 26. No suit on such bond for such taxes 
shall be commenced by the United States unless notice is given as provided 
in the preceding sentence, and no such suit shall be commenced after the 
expiration of one year after the day on which such notice is given. 
(Aug. 24, 1935, c. 642, § 1,49 Stat. 793; Nov. 2, 1966, Pub.L 89-719, Title I, § 105(b), 
80 Stat. 1139; Nov. 2, 1978, Pub.L, 95-585, 92 Stat. 2484.) 
Historical Note 
1978 Amendment. Subsec. (a). Pub.L. before the date it takes effect, or to any per-
95-585 substituted "$25,000" for "12,000'. tons or bonds in respect of any such contract." 
1966 Amendment. Subsec. (d). Pub.L Short Title. Sections 270a to 270d of this 
89-719 added subsec. (d). title are commonly known as the "Miller Act". 
Effective Date of 1966 Amendment. Waiver of Sections 270a to 270d of This 
Amendment by Pub.L 89-719 applicable to Title by Secretary of the Treasury. Act July 
contract entered into pursuant to invitations 11, 1941, c. 290, § 3(b), 55 Stat 585, which 
for bids issued after June 30, 1967, see section authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
114(cK2) of Pub.L 89-719, set out as a note his discretion, to waive sections 270a to 270d 
under section 6323 of Title 26, Internal Reve- of this title with respect to certain contracts 
nuc Code. entered into for the Coast Guard during the 
Effective Date. Section 5 of Act Aug. 24, " ^ ^ £ " 5 * * £ , T T * ^ J* J S ? 
1935. provided in part: That this act (enacting * ~ Jui> 25- mi> c- 327- § *• 6 1 &«• 449« 
sections 270a to 270d of this title] shall take Legislative History. For legislative history 
effect upon the expiration of sixty days after and purpose of Pub.L. 89-719, see 1966 VS. 
the date of its enactment (Aug. 24, 1935], but Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 3722. See, 
shall not apply to any contract awarded pursu- also, Pub.L 95 585, 1978 VS. Code Cong, and 
ant to any invitation for bids issued on or Adm. News, p. 5579. 
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§ 2 7 0 b . Right* of persons furnishing labor or material 
(a) Every person who has furnished labor or material in the prosecution 
of the work provided for in such contract, in respect of which a payment 
bond is furnished under sections 270a to 270d of this title and who has not 
been paid in full therefor before the expiration of a period of ninety days 
after the day on which the last of the labor was done or performed by him 
or material was furnished or supplied by him for which such claim is 
made, shall have the right to sue on such payment bond for the amount, or 
the balance thereof, unpaid at the time of institution of such suit and to 
prosecute said action to final execution and judgment for the sum or sums 
justly due him: Provided, however, That any person having direct contractu-
al relationship with a subcontractor but no contractual relationship express 
or implied with the contractor furnishing said payment bond shall have a 
right of action upon the said payment bond upon giving written notice to 
said contractor within ninety days from the date on which such person did 
or performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the last of the 
material for which such claim is made, stating with substantial accuracy 
the amount claimed and the name of the party to whom the material was 
furnished or supplied or for whom the labor was done or performed. Such 
notice shall be served by mailing the same by registered mail, postage 
prepaid, in an envelop addressed to the contractor at any place he main-
tains an office or conducts his business, or his residence, or in any manner 
in which the United States marshal of the district in which the public 
improvement is situated is authorized by law to serve summons. 
(b) Every suit instituted under this section shall be brought in the name 
of the United States for the use of the person suing, in the United States 
District Court for any district in which the contract was to be performed 
and executed and not elsewhere, irrespective of the amount in controversy 
in such suit, but no such suit shall be commenced after the expiration of 
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one year after the day on which the last of the labor was performed or 
material was supplied by him. The United States shall not be liable for the 
payment of any costs or expenses of any such suit. 
(Aug 24, 1935, c. 642, § 2, 49 Stat. 794; Aug. 4, 1959, Pub.L. 86-135. § 1, 73 Stat. 279.) 
Historical Note 
1959 Amendment. Subsec (b). Pub.L 
86-135 substituted "day on which the last of 
the labor was performed or material was sup-
plied by him" for "date of final settlement of 
such contract". 
Effective Date of 1959 Amendment Sec 
tion 3 of Pub.L. 86-135 provided that: The 
rights of laborers and material men under 
contracts entered into before the effective date 
(Aug 4, 1959] of this amendment [wh;ch 
amended subsec (b) of this section and sev 
uon 270c of this title] shall not be affected " 
Effective Date. Section effective upon toe 
expiration of sixty days after Aug. 24, 1935, 
but not to apply to any contract awarded pur-
suant to any invitation for bids issued on or 
before the date rt takes effect, or to any per 
tons or bonds in respect of any such contract, 
•ee section 5 of Act Aug. 24, 1935. set out as a 
note under section 270 of this title. 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L 86-135. see 1959 L.& 
Code Cong and Adm.News, p. 1995. 
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